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COMPENSATION 
Daniel A. Farber* 
Few areas of law have spawned such a rich scholarly literature, 
with contributions by so many major thinkers, as the takings clause. 
Yet there is no consensus today about takings law-only a general 
belief that the takings problem is difficult and that takings doctrine 
is a mess.I 
This article is yet another look at the takings puzzle. I will not 
attempt to discuss all possible perspectives on takings.2 Instead, I 
will limit myself to discussing economic analyses of takings-not 
because of any presumption that constitutional rules can be ex-
plained through economic analysis, but for narrower reasons. The 
first is simply that this subfield has been the subject of enough schol-
arship to warrant separate treatment. Second, economics might 
well make a special contribution to the analysis of property rights, 
which seems relatively close to its traditional subject matter. 
In Parts I and II of the article, I will survey the economic liter-
ature on takings. The minimum requirement for a theory of takings 
is that it account for the "easy" cases. The easiest case is simply the 
seizure of land by the government to build a road or dam.3 Unfor-
tunately, existing economic models do poorly at explaining why the 
landowner is always compensated in this situation. Part I discusses 
economic models based on insurance, while Part II explores models 
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that focus on rent-seeking. Neither type of model provides a satis-
factory explanation for these easy cases. 
Part II outlines an alternative economic analysis of takings. 
According to public choice theory, legislators will normally offer 
compensation to landowners when property is taken for govern-
ment projects. The reason is that landowners usually form a power-
ful lobby against a project unless they are "bought off."4 The 
takings clause converts this political custom into a formal require-
ment, thereby ensuring what tax analysts call "horizontal equity." 
Making the compensation requirement uniform also protects un-
usually vulnerable groups that might otherwise suffer from viola-
tions of the general custom of compensation. 
In Part Ill, this model is extended to regulatory takings. This 
has been an area of increasing Supreme Court activity, culminating 
in the Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Councif.s 
Essentially, I propose that a regulation should only be consid-
ered a taking when it is the functional equivalent of a government 
appropriation of land. As we will see, many of the Court's decisions 
fit with this theory. In particular, portions of the Lucas rationale 
are consistent with the theory, but the rule announced by the Lucas 
Court is overbroad. 
I 
The takings clause is a notorious source of difficulties in defin-
ing the legitimate scope of government regulation. Courts and com-
mentators confess puzzlement about when a government regulation 
has "gone too far" and become a taking.6 Obviously, it would be 
nice if economic analysis could help illuminate this difficult prob-
lem. In this section, however, I will consider only the application of 
economic analysis to a much simpler situation: the straightforward 
case where the government seizes land to build a road or dam. Why 
do we require the government to compensate the landowner? 
The conventional story about government compensation in this 
4. In an earlier version of this paper, I argued that compensation would "almost al-
ways" be offered to landowners. As Professor Barton Thompson pointed out in his oral 
comments on the paper at the 1990 Stanford Conference on Economic Analysis and the 
Constitution, the theory does not require such a strong empirical postulate. It is sufficient 
that voluntary compensation be a normal legislative practice, but exceptions need not be 
particularly rare. 
5. -U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 60 U.S.L.W. 4842 (1992). 
6. John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda, and J. Nelson Young, Constitutional Law 
402-03 (West, 3d ed. 1986); Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 593 (cited in note 3). 
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simple case is nicely set out by William Fischel and Perry Shapiro. 
It runs as follows: 
[M]ost economists and lawyers would, we believe, conclude 
that the government should pay for the property that it takes. 
The argument, especially that of economists, might be that forc-
ing the government to pay for the resources it gets promotes effi-
ciency. In a world lacking any compensation requirement, the 
obvious fear is that private investors will be inhibited by the 
thought that government will snatch the fruits of their venture. 
The fears of what will happen at the end of the process work 
themselves into the calculation of property owners at the begin-
ning of that process, so that too little capital will be invested in 
productive enterprises. The compensation requirement thus 
serves the dual purpose of offering a substantial amount of pro-
tection to private entitlements, while disciplining the power of 
the state, which would otherwise overexpand unless made to pay 
for the resources that it consumes. 7 
On its face, this seems a plausible explanation for takings 
protection. 
One reason for its plausibility is that it calls to mind a proto-
typical situation where compensation is an issue. Consider a small 
country that is attempting to attract a major foreign investor. 
There is a significant risk of strategic behavior: the government 
makes all kinds of promises to lure the foreign investor, then grabs 
the property later on. The existence of this risk deters foreign in-
vestment. Thus, the government may wish to make a binding com-
mitment of compensation in order to attract investment and further 
economic growth. In this and similar situations, the Fischel and 
Shapiro story rings true. 
The original Framers of the Constitution may have been con-
cerned about protecting non-resident investors. Prior to the fifth 
amendment, a takings clause was included in the Northwest Ordi-
nance because of fears that state legislators would seize lands owned 
by outsiders.s Today, however, the typical application of the tak-
7. William A. Fischel and Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman: Com-
ments on Economic Interpretations of'Just Compensation' Law, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269 (1988). 
8. See Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L. J. 694, 707 (1985). There is some reason to think that the 
Framers, particularly Madison, were mostly concerned about the unfair distribution of bur-
dens. See Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question 
of Federalism, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829, 843-44 (1989). 
Professor Fischel has pointed out another form of discrimination against outsiders that 
is unlikely to be a problem at the state or federal level, but may well occur at the local level. 
This is the problem of overregulation of land use to benefit local residents at the expense of 
outsiders who would like to move into the community. Fischel suggests that a major function 
of the taking clause has been to deter overregulation at the local level. William A. Fischel, 
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ings clause is quite different. When a highway is built or a dam is 
constructed, the affected property is usually owned by local resi-
dents or businesses. This modifies the analysis considerably. 
Consider the situation of a hypothetical foreign investor, Meg-
alith Multinational Ltd. From Megalith's point of view, a compen-
sation guarantee is a net gain, because compensation will be funded 
largely by local taxpayers. Correspondingly, Megalith also has spe-
cial reason to fear seizure: from the government's point of view, a 
seizure without compensation is pure gain, transferring wealth from 
an outsider to local voters. Thus, a compensation rule is unambigu-
ously desirable for the foreign investor such as Megalith. 
The situation of the local resident--call her Susan Citizen-is 
quite different. For Susan, unlike Megalith, a compensation re-
quirement is a mixed blessing. True, Susan gains if her own land is 
seized for a road, since she will receive compensation. But she also 
pays higher taxes (or receives lower government services) in order 
to finance the compensation payments when other people's land is 
seized. On average, the higher taxes just balance the possible expec-
tation of compensation. In effect, Susan is buying insurance against 
a taking, and she will desire to do so only if she is risk-averse. (In 
contrast, Megalith need not be risk-averse to prefer a compensation 
rule, because compensation is financed by the locals-insurance is 
always a good deal if someone else is paying the premiums.) More-
over, Susan also has less reason to fear uncompensated takings. 
The uncompensated seizure of foreigners' property is attractive to 
politicians because foreigners cannot vote. But Susan can vote and 
therefore is a less attractive target for property seizure. 9 
Thus, the Fischel and Shapiro scenario applies in a fairly 
straightforward way to a country seeking to obtain foreign invest-
ment. It becomes considerably more problematic, however, in the 
typical takings situation, that of the local resident whose property is 
used for a road or dam. In that situation, we need to look carefully 
to see whether a compensation requirement can be justified as either 
(a) a form of insurance for risk-averse taxpayers, or (b) a disincen-
tive against ill-conceived government projects. 
Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in Takings, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1581, 
1582-84 (1988). This is an intriguing suggestion, but in this article I have not attempted to 
distinguish among levels of government along these Jines. Although Fischel's analysis is 
somewhat different than that offered here, it has in common a focus on discrimination against 
the politically powerless-in the situation he posits, non-residents who cannot vote in local 
elections. 
9. This analysis applies only in a democracy. In a non-democratic regime, a compen-
sation rule would probably be highly beneficial for citizens for a variety of reasons, but it is 
hard to see how such a rule could be implemented. 
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The insurance model has been extensively explored by Law-
rence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld. They analyze the case of the 
local resident whose property becomes valueless because of a gov-
ernment project. As we saw with our hypothetical Susan Citizen, 
compensation operates as a form of insurance for a resident facing 
this risk. If the road is built through her property, she will receive 
compensation for the loss, but the compensation scheme is funded 
through taxes which she pays in the meantime. Functionally, as 
Blume and Rubinfeld point out, the taxes are equivalent to insur-
ance premiums for risk-averse taxpayers.JO 
As they make clear, the Blume and Rubinfeld analysis does not 
explain why all landowners receive compensation. Their analysis 
suggests that takings compensation should track the demand for in-
surance by different groups of landowners. Only risk-averse taxpay-
ers benefit from a compensation requirement, so they should be the 
main recipients of takings protection. Corporations should behave 
largely as if they were risk-neutral, since shareholders can limit 
risks through diversifying their portfolios. Hence, they should not 
desire takings compensation.II Moreover, the wealthy should be 
less willing to insure against losses of the same size than the poor, 
since a smaller portion of their total wealth is at risk.12 For the 
same reason, compensation should be less desired where only a 
small part of a parcel is seized by the government.D Thus, the in-
surance theory falls short of justifying the core principle of eminent 
domain, which IS that any government seizure requires 
compensation. 
It may be possible to come up with more complex explanations 
for this broader availability of takings compensation. With a little 
imagination, it might be possible to identify various transaction 
costs or secondary incentive effects which might justify expanding 
takings compensation beyond the individuals with a high demand 
for insurance. It is rather unsatisfying, however, to have to compli-
cate the basic model so much in order to explain such "easy" cases. 
In any event, the insurance model faces other challenges. One 
basic question is why, for those property owners who do desire in-
surance, the government should be the supplier of insurance cover-
age by way of the takings clause. Most property losses are covered 
by the private insurance market. If private insurance can cover the 
risk that property will be destroyed by fire, why not the risk that it 
10. Lawrence Blume and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 569, 590-94 (1984). 
II. Id. at 612. 
12. Id. at 606. 
13. Id. at 616. 
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will be taken to make way for a new freeway? Why not leave tak-
ings compensation to Prudential and State Farm? 
Blume and Rubinfeld offer two arguments for the impossibility 
of private insurance. The first is what economists call moral haz-
ard: the tendency of insurance to diminish precautions against loss. 
Insurance would presumably decrease the incentive to lobby against 
seizure of the property.'4 As Lewis Kaplow has pointed out, how-
ever, it is unclear why moral hazard is substantially more of a prob-
lem with takings than with fires.l5 Private insurers might in fact be 
more capable of taking precautions against takings than individual 
citizens. If a potential taking affects a large number of landowners, 
they may have difficulty organizing their opposition. It might make 
a considerable amount of sense to transfer the responsibility for lob-
bying to the insurer to help overcome free-rider and other organiza-
tional problems. Also, self-insurance is a possibility for 
corporations-a category that notably includes institutional lend-
ers, who probably receive a large share of all compensation for 
takings. 
Blume and Rubinfeld also rely on "adverse selection" by indi-
viduals with inside knowledge about the possibility of takings.l6 
Adverse selection is the tendency of insurance programs to attract 
the riskiest customers: life insurance is the most attractive buy for 
the terminally ill, which is why insurers require physicals. Again, 
this does not seem to be an insurmountable barrier to private insur-
ance. The local office of an insurer with numerous policies in the 
same town could probably monitor political developments as well 
as, if not better than, individual property owners. Thus, the insur-
ers would not suffer from having less information about risk than 
insurance applicants. The adverse selection problem also does not 
seem inherently worse than other insurance markets, such as life 
insurance or auto insurance, which seem to function successfully. 11 
As in other markets, adverse selection could be countered by vari-
ous techniques. For instance, adverse selection could be limited by 
requiring the insurance coverage to be purchased well in advance of 
the taking. 
14. ld. at 594. 
15. Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 
549, 540 n.86 (1986). Kaplow may overstate this point. It is probably easier to monitor fire 
precautions than lobbying efforts-and there are obvious reasons for owners to be afraid of 
fires. 
16. Blume and Rubinfeld, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 595-96 (cited in note 10); see also Susan 
Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1697, 
1705 ( 1988). 
17. See Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle (Book Re-
view), 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1561, 1581-82 (1986). 
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There is inevitably an element of speculation in discussing 
whether the market could fill a need that actually has always been 
served by the government. Perhaps, if the government never gave 
compensation for takings, moral hazard or adverse selection would 
turn out to be more serious problems than presently seems likely. 
But this kind of conjecture is not a satisfying basis for either a posi-
tive or a normative theory. 
Thus, the affirmative argument for government-provided, 
mandatory insurance against takings is only moderately persuasive. 
Worse, there is actually a fairly strong counter-argument, which 
Louis Kaplow has developed in detail. Government compensation 
for takings creates a potentially serious moral hazard of its own. 
Suppose a landowner is considering a further investment in his 
property, but there is some chance that the property will be flooded 
by a proposed dam. We would like the owner to consider this possi-
bility when deciding whether to make an investment, since the in-
vestment will be wasted if the dam is built. But if the owner can 
obtain full government compensation for the flooding, she has no 
reason to take the possibility of the dam into account. (If the dam is 
not built, the owner can expect a return from her additional invest-
ment, while she gets her money back from the government if the 
dam is built after all.) So the owner is indifferent to the possible 
construction of the dam and hence will tend to overinvest, with a 
consequential loss in economic efficiency. Is 
Blume and Rubinfeld acknowledge this problem. They at-
tempt to deal with it by adjusting compensation awards so as to 
eliminate the incentive for additional excessive investments.I9 This 
adjustment requires a determination of the most economically effi-
cient use of the land, taking into account the possible government 
project. As Kaplow points out, this adjustment to the award may 
be difficult to make.2o Unless this complex adjustment can be made, 
however, takings compensation may cause significant moral 
hazard.2I 
Fischel and Shapiro have offered a rather interesting defense 
against Kaplow's critique of the insurance argument. Essentially, 
they have tried to reinterpret that argument in a way that preserves 
18. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort. Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 
73 Cal. L. Rev. I, 20 (1985); Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 529 (cited in note 15); Rose-
Ackerman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1702-04 (cited in note 16). 
19. Blume and Rubinfeld, 72 Cal. L. Rev. at 619 (cited in note 10). 
20. Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 532 n.61 (cited in note 15). 
21. To the extent that condemnation law does not provide complete compensation to 
landowners, this moral hazard is diminished. Also, with respect to regulatory takings, the 
moral hazard is probably less simply because of the uncertainty of whether the courts will 
actually determine that the regulation is a taking. 
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the idea of loss aversion but avoids the analogy to insurance. As 
they note, the insurance rationale for takings law is usually attrib-
uted to Frank Michelman's classic article on just compensation.22 
In that article, Michelman speaks of the "demoralization cost" of 
uncompensating takings, which sounds very much like a reference 
to risk aversion, and this ties into the idea of insurance. Fischel and 
Shapiro suggest, however, that Michelman really had something 
quite different in mind: a special psychological trauma experienced 
by individuals whose property is confiscated by the government.23 
Just as people are more upset about having a watch stolen than sim-
ply losing it, they are more upset about having property confiscated 
than destroyed in an accidental fire. Takings law responds to this 
special psychological cost. 
Although this has not been the usual reading of Michelman, it 
may well be correct. The following passage in the Michelman arti-
cle is particularly suggestive: 
The worth of this kind of analysis in a utilitarian compensa-
tion program depends on a number of assumptions which, while 
not void of plausibility, are surely debatable. The assumptions 
are (I) that one thinks of himself not just as owning a total 
amount of wealth or income, but also as owning several discrete 
"things" whose destinies he controls; (2) that deprivation of one 
of these mentally circumscribed things is an event attended by 
pain of a specially acute or demoralizing kind, as compared with 
what one experiences in response to the different kind of event 
consisting of a general decline in one's net worth; and (3) that 
events of the specially painful kind can usually be identified by 
compensation tribunals with relative ease.24 
Thus, Michelman's theory is rooted in a psychology of takings; he 
seems to see the function of compensation awards to be as much 
therapeutic as economic. 
While Fischel and Shapiro may be correct in their interpreta-
tion of Michelman,2s Michelman's observation may not be useful as 
part of an economic analysis. We can account for almost anything 
by positing a specifically tailored set of preferences: people do 
whatever they do because that's what they prefer to do. If people 
have a special distaste for loss of specific parcels of property, we 
22. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (cited in note 3). 
23. Fischel and Shapiro, 17 J. Legal Stud. 269 (cited in note 7). 
24. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1234 (cited in note 3). This analysis seems to offer 
no support for compensation to corporations, who presumably do not require psychological 
reassurance. 
25. As Barton Thompson has observed, Michelman's meaning is quite unclear. See 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1449, 1477 n.117 (1990). 
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might expect to see legal rules geared to this preference. In particu-
lar, we might expect to see compensation rules if the majority of 
members of a society have a taste for compensation rules. But this 
analysis verges on tautology. 
Assuming Michelman is right about human psychology, the 
important questions are why people feel this way and whether they 
are justified in doing so.26 It seems unlikely that economics can 
contribute much to either of those inquiries.27 Whatever else 
Michelman's observation about "pain of a specially acute or demor-
alizing kind" might be, it does not represent just another "cost" to 
be factored into an economic analysis. Michelman's observation 
may turn out to be important for some non-economic -approach for 
takings, but it seems unlikely to contribute much to an economic 
analysis. In particular, it does not add very usefully to the insur-
ance model. 
Kaplow concludes that the case for compensating landowners 
is shaky, and that the insurance rationale is particularly weak, 
though he does not reject compensation out of hand.2s My view is 
somewhat more sanguine. On balance, the insurance theory seems 
tenable but not highly persuasive. The arguments against compen-
sation may not be quite as strong as Kaplow thinks, but the insur-
ance rationale for compensation is less than overwhelming.29 At 
best, then, the insurance theory should play only a supporting role 
in takings analysis. Given this apparently inconclusive coverage of 
the "easy" case for compensation, it seems particularly unlikely that 
the insurance theory is going to be much help in dealing with the 
less tractable problem of regulatory takings. 
II 
The average taxpayer may or may not receive desirable insur-
ance coverage in the guise of takings compensation. Regardless of 
insurance benefits, however, takings compensation might benefit the 
26. See id. at 1480. It is also unclear to me whether Michelman is empirically correct. 
27. Moreover, Michelman's empirical conjecture seems potentially inconsistent with 
basic economic assumptions. If people are "thing oriented" rather than wealth oriented, then 
their preferences may be intransitive. That is, suppose I regard my car as worth $5000 and 
my house as worth $50,000, but I don't regard the total loss of the car as equivalent to a 10% 
decrease in the value of my house. I thus have two items, each of which I apparently regard 
as the equivalent of $5000 in cash, but I do not regard the items as equivalent to each other. 
If this were to turn out to be a very general phenomenon, we would have to rethink most of 
microeconomics. 
28. Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 552, 602-07 (cited in note 15). 
29. For a recent defense of the insurance theory, see Schill, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 853-56 
(cited in note 8). 
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average taxpayer by reducing the level of government takings.3o 
Just as tort liability can provide both insurance and incentives, so 
takings law might perform similar functions. Indeed, the standard 
account of takings presented by Fischel and Shapiro assumes that a 
compensation requirement prevents overexpansion of government 
programs. 
We need to be careful in assessing the effect of takings compen-
sation on state programs. If a project is economically efficient (so 
that its benefits exceed its costs) then the average citizen benefits 
from the project-the expected cost of the project (through loss of 
property seized by the government or through tax increases)-is ex-
ceeded by the benefit of the project. Hence, ignoring insurance ef-
fects for the moment, the taxpayer would be willing ex ante to have 
efficient projects proceed even without compensation. The incentive 
effects of a compensation rule are only desirable, in other words, to 
the extent that inefficient projects are deterred. This beneficial de-
terrence effect has to be balanced against the possible deterrence of 
efficient projects.3I What we will be examining, therefore, is 
whether the compensation requirement causes a net increase in the 
economic efficiency of government projects. Without any hard em-
pirical evidence (or even much soft evidence), the conclusion on this 
point must remain debatable. 
At first blush, it may seem fairly obvious that requiring the 
government to pay the full cost of projects will increase efficiency.32 
In tort law, it is now the conventional wisdom that firms should be 
required to internalize the social costs of their activities, because 
externalities lead to overproduction. If we were dealing with a 
firm-such as a private utility or railroad with authority to engage 
in condemnation (or perhaps a monarchy run for the personal profit 
of the king)-then this usual idea would indeed apply, with the 
usual caveats. But the government is not a profit-maximizing 
firm.33 
If we adopt a public interest theory of government, internal-
izing a cost makes no difference. Public-spirited legislators would 
take into account all the costs and benefits of a proposal, whether 
those costs and benefits are funneled through the government's 
checking account or not. Thus, a public-regarding legislature 
30. Cooter, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 21-22 (cited in note 18). 
31. See Thompson, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1504 (cited in note 25). 
32. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 51 (Little Brown, 3d ed. 1986). 
33. See Schill, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 857 (cited in note 8). In some countries, a dictator 
may operate the government for personal profit. In that situation, a takings requirement 
would optimize government behavior-but of course, a compensation rule would be unen-
forceable against the dictator. 
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should not suffer from "fiscal illusion." On the other hand, if we 
take a public choice approach, we need a much closer analysis to 
determine the effects of a compensation requirement on government 
activities. Public choice gives us no reason to expect that the re-
sponse of government officers will mirror the responses of the own-
ers of a private firm. To determine whether compensation 
requirements will lead legislators to disapprove inefficient projects, 
we need to examine the political dynamics closely. 
Saul Levmore has suggested that the victims of takings, such as 
individuals whose land is used for a highway or dam, are unlikely to 
be well represented in the political process. Because they are an ad 
hoc group, they lack the advantages of repeat political players, par-
ticularly the ability to engage in logrolls.34 Also, ad hoc groups are 
harder to organize, since the group cannot spread its initial organi-
zational costs over a long period of time, and can offer few fringe 
benefits to members. 
Although Levmore is clearly correct about the disadvantages 
of ad hoc groups, he may overstate their comparative weakness in 
the political process. The potential victims of takings lack the ad-
vantages of being repeat players in the political "game," but they 
are attractive "customers" for repeat players such as political par-
ties or individual political entrepreneurs. Moreover they do have an 
important organizational advantage over some other groups, such 
as the taxpayers at large. They form a small group (relative to the 
electorate, at least) and often have high stakes (since they are about 
to have large amounts of property seized by the state). They also 
have the advantage of sharing a geographical connection, and that 
proximity makes it easier to form into a group and to identify them 
in the first place. As neighbors, they are likely to have community 
ties that make organization easier.Js 
If public choice has any one key finding, it is that small groups 
with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the 
political process.36 Apart from considerable anecdotal evidence 
34. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285, 306-07 
(1990). See also Schill, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 860 n.ll6 (cited in note 8). Levmore's analysis 
is presaged in a formal model by Fischel and Perry, in which taking compensation arises from 
the propensity of majorities to exploit minorities. In the absence of compensation, politicians 
then back projects that benefit a majority at the expense of a minority, even if the result is a 
loss in social wealth. Full compensation, on the other hand, will result in the moral hazard 
problem that Kaplow identifies. Dropping a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" in place, Fischel 
and Perry then conclude that the voters would unanimously favor partial compensation. See 
William A. Fischel and Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for 
Takings, 9 Inti. Rev. of L. and Econ. 115 (1989). 
35. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 724-28 
(1985). 
36. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice 
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about the influence of "special interest groups," this finding is 
strongly supported by theory, because of the greater transaction 
costs of organizing larger groups. There is also a substantial body 
of reasonably rigorous empirical evidence about the influence of 
special interest groups. Moreover, even in the absence of constitu-
tional requirements, compensation is often offered voluntarily by 
the government-which strongly suggests that there are substantial 
political rewards for doing so.37 For example, prior to the adoption 
of the takings clause, state legislatures regularly provided landown-
ers with compensation for takings, as did Parliament.Js 
All things being equal, it probably is still true that the dispos-
sessed are disadvantaged by the one-shot nature of their involve-
ment. Thus, relative to other concentrated groups (such as the 
construction firms that may support government construction), 
they may have less clout (again, all things being equal). The rele-
vant question is not, however, their political power relative to the 
groups favoring government projects. That balance of power may 
determine whether landowners will block the project. This does not 
tell us, however, whether imposing a compensation requirement 
will change the political outcome. 
The real issue is comparative: will a compensation require-
ment make legislators more likely to give proper weight to the costs 
of projects. The effect of the compensation requirement is to buy off 
the landowners and shift the cost of the project to other groups. 
Politicians will give more weight to costs as a result of this shift 
only if these other groups have more political power than the land-
owners. But that seems unlikely because the other groups are likely 
to be so diffuse.39 
A similar difficulty attends Richard Epstein's theory that the 
Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 275, 285-95 (1988); Peter L. Kahn, The 
Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on Government, 15 Cornell L. Rev. 280, 
280-81, 288-91 (1990); Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 569 (cited in note 15); Daniel A. Farber 
and PhilipP. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: A Critical Introduction ch. I (U. of Chi. Press, 
1991) ("Law and Public Choice"). 
37. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1256 (cited in note 3). Indeed, compensation for 
physical invasions is almost universal in democracies. See William A. Fischel, Exploring the 
Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of Property? 49 (Berkeley Law 
and Economics Working Paper #91-10). 
38. Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 695-96 n.6, 697 n.9 (cited in note 8). 
39. See Thompson, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1490 n.l64 (cited in note 25). This observation is 
somewhat reminiscent of the moral hazard argument discussed by Rubinfeld and Blume. As 
they point out, one barrier to private insurance for takings is that the insured would have a 
lower incentive to resist government seizures. But a similar problem attends public "insur-
ance" by way of the takings clause. Assuming full compensation, the people whose property 
is seized have no reason to resist government projects. Thus, a takings requirement elimi-
nates an important source of opposition, thereby potentially increasing the number of ineffi-
cient projects. 
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takings clause is designed to prevent rent-seeking.40 A great deal 
has been written about Epstein's general theory, and it is unneces-
sary to recap those discussions here. The point here is a narrow 
one. If we want to deter rent-seeking projects, such as highways 
that are only built to enrich the construction industry, it might con-
ceivably be useful for courts to review and invalidate the projects. 
(I am putting aside obvious questions about judicial legitimacy and 
competence, all of which have been fully explored by Epstein's crit-
ics.4I) But the compensation requirement does not mandate judicial 
review of the merits of particular construction projects. What it 
does mandate is that the owners of the property be compensated for 
their loss. 42 This is not necessarily an effective way to limit rent-
seeking. 
Indeed, rent-seeking might be more effectively contained by an 
anti-compensation requirement, prohibiting the government from 
ever paying compensation for a taking. Although this may seem 
far-fetched, consider the Tellico Dam, best known as the subject of 
TVA v. Hi/1,43 the so-called "snail darter" case. As you may recall, 
the dam had almost been completed when the snail darter, an en-
dangered species, was discovered. Although $100 million had al-
ready been spent on construction, the Court held that an injunction 
against completion was required by the Endangered Species Act. 
That is the part of the story commonly known, but the aftermath is 
more important for present purposes. 
After the Court's decision, the statute was amended to provide 
a special review process for projects like the Tellico Dam. The re-
port of the review group raises doubts that completion of the dam 
was economically warranted. The dam's benefits may have been 
about equal to the value of the farmland that would be flooded, so 
even the small marginal cost of completion was questionable. In 
other words, it might almost have been economically efficient to 
preserve the dam unused as a public monument to rent-seeking 
rather than to close the flood gates! Despite the dam's dubious eco-
nomic value, it was strongly supported by the Tennessee congres-
40. Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 253, 
260, 273 (1986); Merrill, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 1577-78 (cited in note 17). 
41. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Seriously: An Essay for Centrists (Book 
Review), 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1829 (1986); Joseph L. Sax, Takings (Book Review), 53 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 279 (1986); Farber and Frickey, Law and Public Choice at 64-73 (cited in note 36). 
42. The crucial point about the just compensation clause is that it creates only a "liabil-
ity" rule rather than an entitlement. In other words, the government can proceed if it is 
willing to pay. Hence, the issue is whether the government must compensate, not whether it 
can act, provided only that the very weak requirement of a public purpose is satisfied. See, 
e.g., Underkuffier, 100 Yale L. J. at 143-44 (cited in note 1). 
43. 437 u.s. 153 (1978). 
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sional delegation, which succeeded in passing a further amendment 
mandating completion of the dam.44 
Why did the Tennessee delegation so strongly favor a dam that 
would (quite apart from its environmental effects) possibly cost 
more than it was worth? In this respect, the political calculus mir-
rors that for other pork barrel projects. The costs of the project 
were being paid by the federal taxpayer, so far as construction was 
concerned. The major remaining cost of the project was the de-
struction of valuable farmland (possibly as valuable as the dam it-
self). But the voters of Tennessee did not experience this cost, 
because the takings clause shifted that expense from Tennessee 
farmers to federal taxpayers. Is it conceivable that the Tennessee 
delegation would have pressed for this project if local farmers had 
been forced to absorb their own losses? Surely Howard Baker and 
company would not have risked the wrath of the dispossessed Ten-
nessee farmers. In the Tellico case-and with respect to pork barrel 
projects in general-it seems fairly clear that the compensation re-
quirement made the government less responsive to costs, and there-
fore more likely to approve a project of debatable economic 
inefficiency. 
A rule that flatly prohibited compensation would create a pow-
erful lobby against government projects and would therefore tend to 
limit the number of inefficient projects. Of course, landowners will 
not invariably be a more powerful political force than alternative 
cost-bearers. Some projects would surely proceed anyway, with 
great hardship to the landowners. But the landowners would un-
doubtedly kill many projects. There is good reason to believe that 
the latter situation would be more common than its converse, in 
which compensation requirements deter bad projects. 
To see this, consider the other possible candidates for bearing 
the cost. If the project is simply added to the budget, the general 
public will bear the cost, either in the form of increased taxes or a 
higher deficit. Often, the effect of a particular project on the level of 
taxes will be minuscule-particularly at the federal level, where the 
Supreme Court regards this effect as too trivial to provide taxpayers 
with standing.4s Taxpayers are an extremely large, diffuse group. 
44. For citations, see Roger W. Findley and Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Law: 
Cases & Materials 84 (West, 3d ed. 1991). The review committee evaluated the dam's benefits 
as less than those of partially dismantling it and further developing other parts of the river. 
See Note, Environmental Law-The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978: Congress 
Responds to Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 1327, 1338-39 (1979). On 
the economic irrationality of the project, see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail 
Darter: An Environmental Law Paradigm and its Consequences, 19 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 805, 
807-14 (1986). 
45. Nowak, Rotunda, and Young, Constitutional Law§ 2.12(f)(l) (cited in note 6). 
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History provides little reason to think they will be a powerful polit-
ical force in resisting small increases in government spending.46 
If for some reason the taxpayers cannot be recruited to shoul-
der the cost (perhaps because of tax and borrowing limits in state 
constitutions), then the project will have to compete with existing 
claimants on the budget. To get in the budget, the proponents need 
merely defeat the marginal budget item-that is, the item currently 
having barely enough support to get in the budget in the absence of 
the proposed project. 
To evaluate the effect of adopting a compensation requirement, 
as opposed to adopting the anti-compensation rule, we need to con-
sider the potential political strength of landowners against that of 
other possible cost bearers. As Levmore points out, the landowners 
do suffer the disadvantage of being a one-shot group. But consider 
the alternatives: the taxpayers or the weakest of the currently suc-
cessful interest groups. Just to make this specific, assume that the 
latter group consists of park users. If you were a politician, would 
you rather face: 
(a) Taxpayers who will experience a slight tax increase? 
(b) Park users whose programs will suffer small cutbacks? 
(c) Property owners whose houses are about to be seized without 
compensation? 
Even without empirical evidence, the third answer seems 
implausible. 
Assuming that the dispossessed will usually be a stronger polit-
ical force than the alternative cost-bearers, a compensation require-
ment will lead to more rent-seeking (pork barrel) projects than an 
anti-compensation rule. (Note that this is true even if the landown-
ers have little power in absolute terms, so long as they have more 
than the other potential cost-bearers.) The reason is that the com-
pensation requirement will buy off the group otherwise most likely 
to bring costs forcefully to the attention of the legislators. 
This argument may seem paradoxical. A prohibition on com-
pensation shifts costs from the mass of taxpayers to a small number 
of landowners. This seems exploitative, and runs against the com-
mon assumption that small minorities need to be protected from 
overbearing majorities. But as Bruce Ackerman has pointed out, 
the lesson of public choice theory is that minorities are often dispro-
portionately powerful compared with majorities. Often, it is the dif-
46. This point is made explicitly in the tax context by J. Mark Ramseyer and Minoru 
Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors Graetz and 
Kaplow, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1155, 1158 n.ll, 1165 (1989). 
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fuse majority that is in danger of being exploited by a concentrated 
minority, rather than vice versa.47 This is precisely what happens 
with pork barrel projects, where the federal taxpayers are effectively 
exploited by powerful local interests. 
Thus, the rent-seeking theory has a serious flaw as an account 
of the takings clause: It seems to present a stronger case for ban-
ning compensation than for mandating it, if we are serious about 
controlling rent-seeking. 
If we look at the typical government project, then, the conven-
tional version of the rent-seeking argument for a compensation rule 
is quite weak. With respect to the typical project, requiring com-
pensation is less likely to deter rent seeking than would a ban on 
compensation. This does not mean, however, that the present rule 
of mandatory compensation should be rejected. As we will see in 
the next section, the problem needs to be framed more carefully: we 
need to be clear about just which projects are in question, and just 
what alternative we are comparing with the mandatory compensa-
tion rule. 
III 
It might well be safer to stick to critique, rather than turning to 
the more hazardous enterprise of presenting an alternative theory. 
Past experience suggests slim prospects of success for any theory of 
takings. It seems worthwhile, however, to venture a brief explora-
tion of the affirmative implications of the analysis. 
With respect to physical occupations of land by the govern-
ment, there are three rules to consider: 
(I) The current rule, which mandates compensation. 
(2) A rule making compensation optional with the legislature. 
(3) A rule forbidding compensation. 
We can surely reject the third possibility, the anti-compensa-
tion rule. Such a rule would have serious disadvantages. Even if 
risks are fully covered through insurance or portfolio diversifica-
tion, the insurer (or investor) still has a powerful incentive to resist 
any new project. Even if its shareholders are fully diversified, for 
example, a corporation's managers are unlikely to be happy with a 
47. See Ackerman, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 723-34 (cited in note 35). Ackerman's general 
argument may, however, ignore some important countervailing forces. For example, it does 
not take into account the effect of prejudice on racial minorities, which so far have failed to 
derive the full political benefits he suggests stem from being "discrete and insular minorities." 
See Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Af-
firmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 685 (1991). 
Landowners, as a group, obviously do not suffer from similar disabilities. 
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government seizure of its property. The same is true of insurance 
companies, which could be expected to lobby hard against the losses 
covered by their policies. If anything, these groups might be even 
more effective as lobbyists than the individual property owners, 
since they are repeat players. Thus, with or without private insur-
ance of the kind contemplated by Kaplow, we could expect strenu-
ous lobbying against all government projects if government 
compensation were unavailable. 
This outcome seems quite undesirable, partly because of the 
deadweight social costs of the lobbying itself, but also because the 
greater intensity of lobbying would probably eliminate many desira-
ble projects. Not only would we get rid of rent-seeking projects, but 
we would have serious overkill of beneficial projects. Finally, even 
if we were to adopt a strict anti-compensation rule in the Constitu-
tion, there would be an overwhelming temptation for politicians to 
cheat and find ingenious ways to funnel compensation to property 
owners. 
For all these reasons, not to mention obvious political realities, 
an anti-compensation rule is really not in the cards. The previous 
economic literature goes astray, therefore, in trying to compare a 
world with mandatory government compensation to a world in 
which there is never government compensation. The real choice is 
between a rule that mandates compensation and one that makes it 
optional with the legislature. An optional rule would produce com-
pensation in most cases, perhaps the large majority, but there would 
be exceptions, particularly when the property owners for some rea-
son were especially vulnerable politically.4s 
Much of the previous literature has dealt with the choice be-
tween mandatory compensation and no compensation (Rules 1 and 
3). Whatever validity the insurance and rent-seeking arguments 
might have in that context, they apply more strongly to the choice 
between Rules 1 and 2 (optional and mandatory compensation).49 
Thus, the theory presented here is at least as strong as competing 
economic theories, because the arguments made for those theories 
support this one at least as strongly. 
The insurance argument is straightforward. It is one thing to 
suppose that individuals might privately insure against land seizures 
in a world where the government itself never compensates. As we 
48. Rose-Ackerman, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1707 (cited in note 16). 
49. Thus. the theory proposed in this article has at least the relative advantage of being 
at least as strong as all existing competitors. Or to put it another way, past theories have been 
unnecessarily weakened by the implicit assumption that the task of the theory was to com-
pare a rule of zero compensation with a rule of mandatory compensation. Those theories are 
actually more successful in comparing mandatory and optional compensation. 
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have seen, however, the realistic alternative to mandatory compen-
sation is usually voluntary compensation rather than zero compen-
sation. But the prospect of voluntary government compensation 
substantially limits the incentive to buy insurance. If government 
compensation is widespread, landowners will rarely need private in-
surance against the speculative possibility that, if their land is ever 
seized, the government will violate its usual practice of compensa-
tion. Indeed, they would be likely to seek insurance only in the 
unusual cases where they expected a seizure but foresaw political 
obstacles to compensation, making adverse selection a major 
problem. 
In this setting, the overinvestment argument (Kaplow's main 
counter to the insurance model) loses its sting. Denying compensa-
tion to the residual victims (those who fail to receive voluntary gov-
ernment compensation) deters overinvestment only by reducing the 
expected return in seizure cases. But the same effect can be 
achieved by uniformly decreasing the measure of compensation 
while paying compensation to all victims. Risk-neutral victims are 
indifferent between these choices, while risk-averse victims prefer 
the across-the-board reduction. Thus, overinvestment can better be 
dealt with by a uniform reduction in compensation levels. 
For instance, suppose that the government voluntarily offers 
full compensation to ninety percent of all landowners. As Kaplow 
says, this offers an incentive to overinvest, since the landowner can 
expect to receive ninety percent of the excess investment back in 
case of a seizure. We cannot realistically prevent the government 
from offering at least some voluntary compensation. What we can 
do, however, is to offer all landowners ninety percent of the value of 
the land (instead of full value to ninety percent of them). This cre-
ates little more incentive for overinvestment, but does provide wider 
insurance coverage. Note that, unlike the complex compensation 
adjustment proposed by Blume and Rubinfeld, this solution re-
quires only a percentage decrease in compensation awards. While 
we do not actually see anything as simple as a percentage reduction, 
we do find that eminent domain awards are subject to valuation 
rules that make them under-compensatory. 
As compared with an optional compensation rule, mandating 
compensation also offers better control of rent-seeking. Under an 
optional compensation rule, the government will offer compensa-
tion except when the residual cost-bearers have more political clout 
than the victims of the seizure. But if we want to control rent-seek-
ing, these are just the cases where we should offer compensation, so 
as to trigger the political efforts of these residual cost-bearers. A 
1992] TAKINGS 297 
mandatory rule extends cooperation to this crucial category of 
cases. 
The rent-seeking point may seem confusing, given my earlier 
criticisms in Part II of the rent-seeking argument for just compensa-
tion. Suppose we divide the universe of potential government 
projects into two groups. so Class I consists of those projects which 
would be blocked if the cost of the project remained on those whose 
land is being seized-roughly speaking, those projects where the 
landowners are more politically powerful than the taxpayers gener-
ally. Class II consists of the remaining cases, in which the taxpay-
ers would generate stronger political opposition to bearing costs 
than the landowners. Payment of compensation shifts the cost of 
the project from the landowner to the taxpayer. Thus, compensa-
tion will decrease the likelihood that the project will be adopted 
only if the project belongs to Class II. If we are considering the 
typical government project, paying compensation will deter adop-
tion of the project only if we assume that the typical project belongs 
to Class II. Earlier in this paper, I have argued that in fact the 
contrary is probably true. For this reason, a rule forbidding com-
pensation, which deters Class I projects, would be more likely to 
deter the typical government project, simply because the relative 
size of the two classes of projects. Thus, if we are comparing an 
anti-compensation rule with a full compensation rule, as we were 
earlier, the rent-seeking argument for compensation doesn't work. 
If voluntary compensation is allowed, however, the argument 
plays out quite differently. The legislature will always want to offer 
compensation to Class I projects anyway, so as to limit the political 
opposition to the project.si Hence, the only projects where com-
pensation is not voluntarily offered will belong to Class II. Even 
though the typical project belongs to Class I, we no longer care 
about the typical projects because they are getting compensated 
anyway. Only in the atypical (Class II) cases will compensation 
ever become a litigated issue. Those cases involve projects that, by 
definition, could be more easily blocked by the taxpayers than by 
the landowners. Hence, a compensation requirement will deter 
those projects by mobilizing a more politically powerful group in 
50. I am putting aside the possibility that the political forces might be balanced pre-
cisely evenly in some subset of cases. In those cases, a compensation rule will make no differ-
ence to the political attractiveness of a project. 
51. A complete theory would need to take into account the possibility that politicians 
would have incomplete information about the political forces involved, and so would some-
times make mistakes in deciding whether to compensate voluntarily. There is no apparent 
reason to think that this would change the conclusion fundamentally. 
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opposition.5 2 Optional compensation not only leaves politically 
weak owners uncompensated, but also makes it more likely that 
their land will be used, even if other land would be more suitable. 
Thus, as compared with an optional compensation rate, the 
mandatory compensation rule can limit inefficient construction 
projects.s3 
Mandating compensation rather than making it optional has 
two other advantages. As Kaplow stresses, there is an important 
benefit to predictability so that landowners can make sensible in-
vestment decisions.s4 The mandatory rule obviously furthers pre-
dictability. There is also another, less obvious advantage to a 
compensation requirement. By mandating compensation, the tak-
ings clause has led the courts to develop uniform rules about how 
compensation is to be calculated. This uniformity is quite benefi-
cial, since otherwise landowners may be unclear about the amount 
of compensation even if they are confident of receiving some pay-
ment from the government. 
From the perspective outlined here, the takings clause is not 
best considered as forcing compensation on generally unwilling leg-
islatures. Even without a constitutional mandate, legislatures could 
be expected to offer compensation quite often, perhaps routinely. 
On this view, the takings clause is like trade usage law.ss Since a 
trade usage is (by definition) a customary industry practice, in most 
cases legal enforcement is superfluous. But one party to the con-
52. Thus, I agree with Schill's argument that a compensation requirement will deter 
exploitative behavior by factions toward politically weak adversaries. See Schill, 137 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. at 861-65 (cited in note 8). He seems to view this, however, as a common problem. 
Since I believe that Class II is relatively small, it seems likely to me that exploitative projects 
of this kind are atypical; indeed, I would argue that such projects are usually less attractive to 
factions than the pork-barrel projects contained in Class I, where the public as a whole is the 
subject of exploitation. But for the reasons discussed in the text, a mandatory compensation 
requirement has "bite" only for Class II cases, and in those cases Schill's argument actually is 
valid. 
53. Note, however, that there is a potential for overdeterrence of Class II projects, be-
cause the opposing group (the taxpayers or the group favoring the marginal existing budget 
item) may kill even an efficient project if the benefits of the project are distributed elsewhere. 
But this problem should arise only under limited circumstances, because the taxpayers are 
less likely to kill efficient projects. If the benefits are very widely distributed, then many 
taxpayers will be beneficiaries and have little reason to oppose the project. On the other 
hand, if the beneficiaries are a small group, they will have inherent organizational advantages 
over the taxpayers at large, of the kind discussed in the text. Moreover, if the project is 
efficient, the beneficiaries will have a higher stake than the cost-bearers, and all things being 
equal will have greater incentives to take political action. 
Nevertheless, for one reason or another, one of these mechanisms might misfire, killing 
an efficient project. This cost of having a mandatory compensation rule must be offset against 
its benefits. 
54. Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 558-59 (cited in note 15). 
55. For an explanation of this aspect of contract law, see E. Allen Farnsworth, Con-
tracts§ 7.13 (Little Brown, 2d ed. 1990). 
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tract will sometimes find it advantageous to violate the trade usage. 
Legal enforcement forestalls this strategically motivated misbehav-
ior, thereby upholding the other party's reasonable expectations. 
Similarly, the takings clause prevents strategic defections by the leg-
islature from the political "trade usage" of just compensation. 
One of the puzzles of takings law is why a landowner is entitled 
to compensation when only a small part of the property is physi-
cally occupied by the government, but not when a government regu-
lation causes an equivalent decrease in the market value of the tract. 
Why is physical occupation so important to takings law? The uni-
formity theory suggests two answers. 
First, all things being equal, legislators are more likely to pro-
vide voluntary compensation for physical occupations, because 
landowners are likely to lobby more vigorously. (This is the oppo-
site of Levmore's view that it is harder to organize opposition to 
physical takings because smaller groups are involved.)s6 One rea-
son is that physical occupation is highly visible. This makes it eas-
ier for the individual ("rationally ignorant") landowner to assess 
her own situation, simply by looking at a map of the project. It also 
makes it easier for him to seek out other victims of the project, be-
cause they are easily identifiable. Finally, there may be a psycho-
logical loss associated with physical incursions that is likely to spark 
firmer lobbying efforts. Since physical occupations lead to more in-
tense political pressure on legislators, the supporters of the project 
are more likely to offer compensation in order to buy off potential 
opposition. Because the purpose of the takings clause is to make 
compensation practice uniform, it follows the same contours and 
gives special attention to physical occupation. 
The second reason for making physical occupation the key to 
compensation is that it provides a convenient bright line. In a 
clause which primarily functions to provide uniformity, a bright 
line is especially attractive. If courts used a diminution-of-value 
test, limiting compensation to cases where the extent of the physical 
occupation substantially decreased the value of the whole tract, ad-
ditional uncertainty would be introduced. Thus, the benefits of uni-
formity, which help support the clause in the first place, strongly 
support a bright-line interpretation. The resulting rule is that the 
government must pay compensation whenever it physically occu-
pies land. 
56. Levmore, 22 Conn. L. Rev. at 320 (cited in note 34). 
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IV 
There is little disagreement about whether landowners should 
be compensated when their lands are seized for roads or dams. As 
observed earlier, however, there is a great deal of dispute about reg-
ulatory takings. It is only natural to inquire about the implications 
of the uniformity theory for regulatory takings. 
As its language suggests, the takings clause was apparently 
designed for condemnation cases in which the government seizes 
property for roads and the like.s1 In Justice Holmes's famous opin-
ion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,ss however, the Court held 
that a taking can exist if the government "goes too far" in regulat-
ing private property. In Pennsylvania Coal, the Court struck down 
a law that effectively destroyed the economic value of certain min-
ing rights. 
In the last fifteen years, the Court has applied the takings 
clause to a variety of government regulations.s9 For instance, the 
federal government was required to pay a developer in order to ob-
tain public access to a marina that the developer had connected 
with a public waterway.60 To take another example, the Court also 
found a taking when New York required landlords to give their ten-
ants access to cable television. The reason was that a cable box 
would "take" some of the space on the roof.6I 
Two 1987 cases provide particularly good illustrations of the 
current state of takings law. Keystone 62 was in many respects a 
replay of the 1922 Pennsylvania Coal decision that began the law of 
regulatory takings. Keystone involved a newer Pennsylvania statute 
requiring coal mines to provide support for the land overhead, in-
cluding homes, businesses, and public property such as schools. 
Despite the resemblance between the two Pennsylvania statutes, the 
Court distinguished Pennsylvania Coal and upheld the more recent 
statute. The majority found two important distinctions between the 
statutes. First, the more recent statute benefitted a much broader 
group. Second, the earlier statute made certain mines entirely 
57. See Thompson, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1458 (cited in note 25). 
58. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
59. John A. Humbach, Economic Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 Pace En vir. L. 
Rev. 311 (1987); Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly 
Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 9 (1987). Some lower-court judges have re-
sponded by more vigorously applying the takings clause to environmental regulations. See 
Lee R. Epstein, Takings and Wetlands in the Claims Court: Florida Rock and Loveladies 
Harbor, 20 Envir. L. Rep. 10517 (Envir. L. Institute, Washington, D.C., 1990). 
60. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
61. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
62. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
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unusable, while the newer statute only required that about five per-
cent of the coal be left in the ground for support. 
In contrast, the Court provided vigorous protection to prop-
erty rights in another 1987 decision. Nol/an 63 involved a California 
couple who wanted to build a larger beach house. As a condition 
for a building permit, the state required them to allow the public to 
walk along the beach. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia 
conceded, for purposes of argument, that California could have 
banned the Nollan's construction entirely, in order to preserve the 
public's right to see the ocean from the street. But Scalia found an 
inadequate connection between the public's right to view the ocean 
and the permit condition. Hence, the Court held this permit condi-
tion to be a taking. 
The takings clause has long been considered a particularly 
messy area doctrinally. Given the very different attitudes toward 
government regulation found in contemporaneous opinions such as 
Keystone and Nol/an, it is not surprising that this reputation for 
incoherence has survived.64 Nevertheless, the results in the cases 
(as opposed to the opinions) do fit a pattern.6s 
The Court has frequently repeated Justice Holmes's statement 
that a sufficiently great decrease in the value of the regulated prop-
erty constitutes a taking. Yet, only once since 1922 has the Court 
actually found a taking on this basis. Apparently, only the most 
extreme loss of value will trigger a takings holding.66 
In contrast, the Court has been quite willing to find a taking 
where the effect of the government regulation is not just to restrict 
the owner's control over her own property, but to transfer the right 
to use the property to a third party. In particular, where a third 
party is given the right to physically occupy real estate, the Court 
seems almost certain to find a taking. 67 (Tribe remarks that this 
"obsession" with physical invasions "borders on fetishism.")6s For 
63. Nol/an v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
64. For fuller discussions of the 1987 cases, see Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law 
and Economics (Scott, Foresmen, 2d ed. 1990); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and 
Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. I; Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the 
Taking Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 (1988); Frank 
Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 Co1um. L. Rev. 1600 (1988). 
65. Margaret Radin notes the existence of this pattern in Margaret Jane Radin, The 
Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1667, 1678-80, 1691-92 (1988). 
66. Lucas, the one exception, is discussed below. 
67. Charles Fried, Protecting PropertY-Law and Politics, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 44, 
52-53 (1990). For a recent application of this test, see Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 
(1992). 
68. Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 603 (cited in note 3). Professor Levmore is, 
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example, in Nollan, the Court was quick to find a taking where the 
government had required the Nollans to convey an easement. 
The physical invasion cases are hard to square with any of the 
models considered in Parts I and II. Under insurance models, 
physical occupation should be unimportant; only diminution in 
value should matter. The rent-seeking models would also seem to 
have little connection with physical occupancy-it is hard to see 
why rent-seeking would be more likely to take the form of an ease-
ment. Indeed, transfers of possessory rights have a particular disad-
vantage as a method of rent-seeking, because they are relatively 
visible69 and thus more likely to be resisted than more subtle regula-
tory intrusions. This leaves something of a puzzle about why the 
Court offers so much protection to possession-a right which Ep-
stein has aptly described as the right to "blockade" others from us-
ing the property. 10 
In contrast, the Court's stress on physical occupancy fits nicely 
with the uniformity theory. Recall that this theory views the tak-
ings clause as an effort to universalize the common practice of legis-
latures. As we have seen, this theory requires government 
compensation whenever the government itself physically occupies 
property. If the government were allowed to evade this require-
ment by transferring possession to third parties without paying 
compensation, a serious loophole would be created. Rather than 
holding title to roads, for example, the government could charter a 
private road company, which could then be given the legal right to 
use designated land without compensation. This would create an 
obvious opportunity for strategic evasion of the takings clause. 
Since one purpose of the clause is to prevent strategic misbehavior, 
the clause should clearly be interpreted to plug this loophole. Be-
sides inviting strategic misbehavior, exclusion of third-party trans-
fers from the compensation requirement would open the door to ad 
if anything, even more vehement in rejecting physical invasion as a factor in takings, as re-
flected in a hypothetical apparently based on the movie, Down and Out in Beverly Hills: 
Imagine, for example, that the government planned to deal with the problem of 
homelessness by requiring all homeowners and landlords whose residential proper-
ties are worth more than $60,000 per inhabitant to take in and care for one home-
less person for a period of three years. Drafted and litigated properly (with perhaps 
some promise of compensation for any torts or crimes committed against the prop-
erty owners), I think that this could be done in a way that did not amount to a 
compensable taking. 
Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 1359 (1991). See 
also id. at 1352 (questioning whether government seizures of numerous parcels of land should 
be considered takings). 
69. Often, literally "visible"-as in the people strolling across the Nollan's beach. 
70. Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 2, 3 (1990). 
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hoc compensation schemes, reducing the benefits of a uniform 
approach. 
Once we think of the takings clause as a method of universal-
izing the usual practice of government compensation for certain 
losses, it seems clear that the class of compensable events must be 
defined so as to block easy government evasion and maintain pre-
dictability. If we think of "just compensation" as being something 
like a contract term, the physical use standard seems quite plausible 
as a contractual formalization of the informal legislative practice.7I 
The Court's recent decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Councifn was its first in seventy years to find a taking based solely 
on diminution of value, rather than a third-party transfer. Lucas 
involved a beach preservation statute that allegedly created a com-
plete bar to the development of certain land. The Court held that a 
land-use regulation of this type is a per se taking, unless the land's 
only economically viable uses were prohibited under prior state law, 
so that the owner never had the right to engage in them anyway.73 
Interestingly, the Court held that this rule only may apply to land, 
not personal property. 74 The Court also suggested that the rule 
may apply only to direct regulations of the use of land, as opposed 
to general regulations that incidentally make a particular parcel of 
land worthless.7s In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that takings law 
should primarily be concerned with discrimination by regulations 
that target only a few individuals. 76 
Although Justice Scalia's majority opinion does not focus on 
discrimination, its central rationale is consistent with the theme of 
this Article. In considering government appropriations, we have 
used government construction projects as a paradigm, but it is also 
common for the government to appropriate lands for preservation 
purposes. As Justice Scalia points out, development bans can oper-
ate as the functional equivalent of nature preserves: 
On the other side of the balance, affirmatively supporting a 
compensation requirement, is the fact that regulations that leave 
71. The theory might be taken as either normative or causal explanations of judicial 
decisions. I am hesitant to ascribe an unconscious awareness of my conclusions to the Jus-
tices. There is, however, at least some reason to think that intuitions about the political 
process have shaped takings law, and that public choice corresponds with the image of poli-
tics held by at least some Justices. See Thompson, 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1476 and n.lll (cited in 
note 25). 
72. -U.S.-, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 60 U.S.L.W. 4842 (1992). 
73. Id. at 4848. 
74. ld. at 4848-49. 
75. ld. at 4848 n.l4. 
76. ld. at 4858 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under the analysis presented in this article, 
Stevens is correct that the generality of a regulation should be an important factor. 
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the owner of land without economically beneficial or productive 
options for its use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be left 
substantially in its natural state-carry with them a heightened 
risk that private property is being pressed into some form of pub-
lic service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm .... 
The many statutes on the books, both state and federal, that pro-
vide for the use of eminent domain to impose servitudes on pri-
vate scenic lands preventing developmental uses, or to acquire 
such lands altogether, suggest the practical equivalence in this 
setting of negative regulation and appropriation. 77 
Since landowners are typically compensated when their land is 
incorporated into national parks or other preservation areas, the 
"uniformity" rationale provides a strong argument for compensa-
tion when the government uses a preservation ban to achieve the 
same goal. The uniformity rationale also helps explain why the Lu-
cas rule applies only to land, since the government does not custom-
arily seize personal property for preservation purposes. It also 
explains why incidental effects on land values are irrelevant; unless 
a regulation is targeted at land use, it is unlikely to be a covert 
method of establishing a nature preserve. Only regulations that are 
functionally equivalent to government acquisitions should be 
treated as takings. 
Unfortunately, Lucas focuses on loss of economic value, rather 
than on the more salient question of functional equivalency. A land 
use regulation that affects many landowners may create a range of 
effects, with little economic impact on many owners and enormous 
impacts on a few. The fact that a few of the owners happen to suffer 
a severe loss of market value does not establish that a regulation is 
functionally equivalent to an appropriation. Moreover, as Justice 
Stevens points out, Lucas actually creates a perverse disadvantage 
for landowners suffering some economic loss, who would be better 
off if they could arrange to suffer even more severe losses so that 
they could obtain compensation. 1s 
Lucas was correct, however, to recognize a nuisance exception 
from its loss-of-value rule. We do not customarily compensate peo-
ple when we order them to halt nuisances, so the uniformity ration-
ale does not apply.79 But, as Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion 
recognizes, the common law of nuisance provides only a partial de-
scription of behavior that is considered socially harmful, and hence 
77. ld. at 4846. 
78. ld at 4859 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
79. The only exception to this statement may be Spurs Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. 
Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972), a rather unusual "coming to the nuisance" case. 
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appropriately banned without compensation.so Many statutes are 
neither the functional equivalent of appropriations (where compen-
sation is normal) nor of nuisance decrees (where compensation is 
rare). In this rather large "grey area," there is no clear compensa-
tion practice to use as a benchmark. The uniformity rationale does 
not apply in this grey area, and the Court should not find a taking. 
In short, while the fundamental rationale of Lucas is economi-
cally sound, the rule established by the Court is overbroad. By first 
including all claims by landowners who have suffered a sufficient 
economic loss, and then excluding only claims by those committing 
nuisances, the Court's rule does a poor job of identifying those regu-
lations that are functionally equivalent to government land acquisi-
tions. Functional equivalence, not economic loss or nuisance law, 
should provide the test. 
v 
Economic analysis can be a powerful critical tool.si For exam-
ple, there is considerable intuitive appeal to the idea that the takings 
clause prevents the government from imposing heavy costs on a few 
individuals instead of spreading them more broadly.s2 As we have 
seen, however, once this concept is formalized in the insurance 
model of just compensation, its weaknesses become apparent. Thus, 
economic analysis can be a powerful critical tool. A plausible alter-
native conjecture is that targets of government land acquisitions are 
peculiarly incapable of protecting themselves through the political 
process. This is not an unattractive argument, but again economic 
analysis exposes its difficulties. Because the targets of takings are a 
relatively small group with high individual losses, public choice the-
ory indicates that they typically can better protect their interests 
through the political process than many other groups, such as the 
taxpayers at large. Here, economic analysis makes a useful contri-
bution by forcing a careful statement of the hypothesis and by con-
necting the takings issue with a more general problem, that of 
interest group influence. 
80. I d. at 4850 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The common law of nui-
sance is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex and interde-
pendent society.") 
81. Another promising field for economic analysis is the first amendment. See, e.g., 
Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech. Constitutionalism. Collective Choice, 56 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
1317 (1988); Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First 
Amendment, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 554 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic 
Perspective, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. I (1986). 
82. See Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 605 (cited in note 3). In Yee v. Escon-
dido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 4302 (1992), Justice O'Connor suggests that the concept of undue 
burden is crucial where there is no physical occupation. 
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Thus, the generality and precision encouraged by economic 
analysis can be helpful in exposing the flaws of some conventional 
constitutional arguments for compensation. On the other hand, 
economic analysis is not without its own drawbacks, including the 
notorious lack of realism of its assumptions. In particular, there is 
an emotional aspect to takings compensation that economics seems 
to miss. Perhaps economic analysis can only take us so far regard-
ing these issues, and something more akin to Michelman's psycho-
logical theory is also needed. 
In terms of the takings clause itself, economic analysis leaves 
us with a trio of explanations.s3 First, with regard to foreign inves-
tors, there is a straightforward argument for the takings clause as a 
form of precommitment by the legislature. Second, in the more typ-
ical situation where the property of citizens is used for roads or 
dams, there is a viable argument, but not a powerful one, for the 
takings clause as a form of insurance. Third, because the legislature 
will usually offer compensation voluntarily, the takings clause can 
be defended as a prophylactic barrier against a serious form of dis-
crimination against politically disfavored groups.s4 
As Kaplow has pointed out, it is important to have consistency 
in transition rules.ss Since it is impractical to ban compensation 
entirely, the only feasible, consistent practice is to mandate compen-
sation for all property owners whose land is seized by the govern-
ment. This uniform rule has some efficiency benefits: it increases 
predictability and decreases the likelihood of strategic behavior. 
The uniform rule also has important fairness value. Perhaps it 
would merely be bad luck if, in a world with a ban on government 
compensation, your land turned out to be in the path of a road or 
the reservoir of a dam. But in a world where government compen-
sation is often available, it is unacceptable that some groups are de-
nied compensation because of their unusual political vulnerability. 
On this analysis, the main function of the takings clause is to 
formalize a frequent practice of democratic legislatures. Formality 
83. There is no reason to expect that a practice will have the same normative or empiri-
cal justification in all situations. Thus, a careful analysis of takings compensation may well 
reveal that compensation has different justifications in different circumstances. Earlier writ-
ers may have tried too hard to uncover a unique justificatory theory. In my view, the uni-
formity theory is the most powerful and covers most situations, but it need not stand alone. 
It should be noted that a fourth explanation applies to condemnation by private utilities, 
and perhaps to some government enterprises providing services for a fee. That is the cost-
internalization argument discussed in text accompanying note 33. 
84. The equal protection clause, as currently understood, would not be adequate to 
prevent such discrimination. Absent a showing of racial motivation, the government would 
have to establish only a rational basis. 
85. Kaplow, 99 Harv. L. Rev. at 558-59 (cited in note 15). 
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offers the advantages of uniformity in coverage and also allows the 
development of systematic compensation measures. In tum, the 
existence of a uniform compensation requirement limits the need for 
monitoring proposed government projects and lobbying for com-
pensation on an ad hoc basis.s6 
This uniformity theory of takings centers on the risk of dis-
crimination. Although the discussion has had a primarily norma-
tive focus, the theory could also serve as the basis for a positive 
theory of takings law. The prediction would be that the growth of 
takings law correlates with the risk of discrimination in various gov-
ernmental settings. One specific prediction would be that the likeli-
hood of finding a taking decreases to the extent that formalized 
procedures are used to control government decisionmaking. Thus, 
in contrast to legislative decisions, judicial decisions would rarely be 
considered takings, since the risk of discrimination is comparatively 
low. In zoning, the implication would be that legislative spot zon-
ing, where the risk of discrimination is high, would be much more 
likely to be found to be a taking than a similar land use restriction 
imposed after an administrative hearing and judicial review.s1 
The intuition supporting compensation for takings is very 
strong, but not easy to articulate. Given the array of scholars who 
have previously tackled the subject, it would be presumptuous to 
expect to dispose of the problem. But the economic analysis offered 
in this paper in the form of the uniformity theory does dovetail 
nicely with strong normative concerns about equality and fairness. 
Though it does not purport to be a complete explanation, at the 
very least it illuminates an important facet of takings law. It also 
suggests a relatively straightforward approach to regulatory tak-
ings: A regulation is a taking if it is functionally equialent to a gov-
ernmental land acquisition. 
We are apt to think of constitutional rules as tailored either to 
protect particularly important individual interests or to prevent par-
86. It would be unrealistic to suggest that the Framers had this specific conception of 
just compensation. Nevertheless, the trade usage theory is consistent with two important 
aspects of their thought: their focus on physical appropriation, see Note, 94 Yale L. J. at 711 
(cited in note 8), and on the danger of political abuse by factions at the expense of weaker 
groups, see The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison). 
Professor McConnell has suggested that one reason for applying the free exercise clause 
only to the federal government was the view that small, intensely affected minorities would 
have adequate political power on the state level, but not in the remote arena of Washington 
politics. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1409, 1476 (1990). If so, the same reason may explain why 
the takings clause was applied only to the federal government. 
87. See also Levmore, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 1345 (cited in note 68) (suggesting that spot 
zoning is likely to be considered a taking because the affected individuals are often politically 
unprotected). 
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ticularly dangerous political pathologies. If this analysis of the tak-
ings clause is correct, we also need to remember a third possible 
function of individual rights: providing horizontal equity. It may 
seem a small thing to insist that what the government does for most 
people voluntarily, it should do for the politically weak as well. 
Nonetheless, it is an important principle of civilized government, 
and one deserving of respect. 
